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Attention and memory are typically studied as separate topics, but they are highly intertwined. Here we
discuss the relation between memory and two fundamental types of attention: perceptual and reflective.
Memory is the persisting consequence of cognitive activities initiated by and/or focused on external informa-
tion from the environment (perceptual attention) and initiated by and/or focused on internal mental represen-
tations (reflective attention). We consider three key questions for advancing a cognitive neuroscience of
attention and memory: To what extent do perception and reflection share representational areas? To what
extent are the control processes that select, maintain, and manipulate perceptual and reflective information
subserved by common areas and networks? During perception and reflection, to what extent are common
areas responsible for binding features together to create complex, episodic memories and for reviving
them later? Considering similarities and differences in perceptual and reflective attention helps integrate
a broad range of findings and raises important unresolved issues.Different research traditions tend to emphasize either atten-
tional phenomena (Posner and Rothbart, 2007) or memory
phenomena (Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Squire and Wixted,
2011). Although this ‘‘divide and conquer’’ approach has been
extremely useful for advancing knowledge about cognition, there
is increasing recognition that fully understanding eachmay entail
understanding the other. Here we focus on the similarities and
differences across these domains and an emerging picture of
how they interact. We build, in particular, on two previous theo-
retical frameworks: the external/internal taxonomy of attention
(Chun et al., 2011) and the multiple-entry-modular (MEM) model
of cognition, which views memory as traces of perceptual and
reflective processing (Johnson and Hirst, 1993). Drawing on
these ideas, and empirical findings that they incorporate, we
propose an integrative perceptual/reflective attention/memory
(PRAM) framework, which serves to organize current findings
and theoretical ideas regarding the relation between attention
and memory, and which highlights key unresolved questions.
Cognition can be broadly divided into perceptual processes,
initiated by and/or directed at external sensory information
from the environment, and reflective processes, initiated by
and/or directed at internal mental representations. Perceptual
processes operate on ‘‘incoming,’’ external stimuli (e.g., reading
text, listening to a song). Reflective processes are directed at
internal representations, such as thoughts, memories, imagery,
decision options, or features of problems. That is, reflective
processes can operate on representations in the absence of cor-
responding external stimuli or independent of current external
input (e.g., thinking about what to have for dinner, remembering
a friend’s remark).
At any given moment, not all features, objects, and events in
the environment or in themind can be processed equally (Marois520 Neuron 72, November 17, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.and Ivanoff, 2005). Both perception and reflection are inherently
selective, requiring mechanisms of attention—modulating, sus-
taining, and manipulating the information that is most relevant
for current and/or future behavior (Chun et al., 2011). The
by-products of these perceptual and reflective attentional
processes are registered as changes or records in the cognitive
system, changes that we call ‘‘memory.’’
Although the border between perceiving and reflecting can be
fuzzy, there are meaningful differences. Logically, perceiving
and reflecting are unlikely to engage exactly the same neural
hardware or have exactly the same memorial consequences.
That would produce an epistemological quagmire in which we
could not tell fact from fantasy in perceiving, thinking, or remem-
bering (Johnson, 2006). On the other hand, if there were no inter-
actions between perception and reflection, we would not be
able to constructively and creatively cumulate knowledge
across experiences of perceiving and thinking. To what extent
do perception and reflection activate the same representational
and processing regions? To what extent do they have similar
and different memorial consequences? Under what conditions
do they operate independently and by what mechanisms do
they interact?
Our review and PRAM framework lead us to several hypo-
theses that invite further testing. (1) Perception and reflection
engage some of the same areas (e.g., posterior sensory areas)
for representing information (e.g., concrete items such as
objects, faces, and scenes). However, the extent to which they
engage the same or different representations within these areas
is an open question. The degree of overlap should predict the
extent to which perception and reflection influence each other
and how likely they are to be confused—for example, in source
memory tasks. (2) Perception and reflection both involve frontal
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Perspectiveand parietal regions that control the direction/focus of attention.
However, whether they engage the same regions for similar
cognitive functions is an open question and should dictate
when perception and reflection interfere with or facilitate each
other. (3) It is well accepted that the hippocampus/medial
temporal lobe region associates attended information with other
existing representations throughout the brain (Davachi, 2006;
Ranganath, 2010). The resulting configural representations
bind multiple features (e.g., perceptual, spatial, temporal,
semantic, emotional details) together and give representations
an episodic quality (i.e., they have source or contextual informa-
tion). Are there differences in configural processing active during
perception and reflection?
Perceptual Attention
Sensory information (e.g., sights, sounds, smells) arrives from
different locations in space and points in time. Perceptual atten-
tion selects and modulates this information according to current
task goals. In the PRAM framework, such processing yields per-
sisting records (traces or memories). Because most research
has used visual stimuli, our review will focus on the visual
modality.
Limited processing capacity prevents equal attention to all
items, but when cues direct selective attention to specific loca-
tions, perceptual performance is enhanced for cued items (Pos-
ner et al., 1980), as is memory for these attended items (Eger
et al., 2004; Uncapher et al., 2011). Perceptual attention can
also select on the basis of features. In a classic study, Rock
and Gutman (1981) showed participants two abstract shapes
that spatially overlapped on each trial. One shape was red and
one was green, and each participant was told to attend to
shapes in only one of the colors. Shapes in the other color
were poorly remembered later, even though they spatially over-
lapped with attended shapes that were remembered.
Even with only brief exposures, we appear to store a great
deal of detailed perceptual information about selected informa-
tion (Hollingworth and Henderson, 2002; Potter, 1976). For
example, in one study (Brady et al., 2008), participants saw
2,500 pictures of objects, each for 3 s, with instructions to try
to remember them. On a later forced-choice recognition test,
participants selected the correct previously seen item 92% of
the time; even more remarkably, performance was still 87%
when participants were required to discriminate between an
original picture and the same object in a different state or orien-
tation. In priming studies using even briefer presentations, and
no instructions to remember, participants show memory for
quite specific representations, although participants do not
consciously recognize the items (repetition priming; e.g., Tulving
and Schacter, 1990; Wiggs andMartin, 1998; Henson and Rugg,
2003). For example, if participants saw an item for 1 s, they were
subsequently better able to identify it under degraded stimulus
conditions, even when they did not remember having seen the
item before (e.g., Jacoby and Dallas, 1981). A neural measure
of such behavioral priming measures of implicit memory is
provided by repetition suppression or attenuation during fMRI:
compared to the first exposure to a stimulus, repeating a stim-
ulus results in less activity in representational areas that are
active when stimuli of that class are perceived (Epstein andKanwisher, 1998; Grill-Spector et al., 1999; Kanwisher et al.,
1997; Puce et al., 1995; Schacter and Buckner, 1998). For
example, object repetition attenuates activity in the lateral
occipital complex (LOC, Grill-Spector et al., 1999; Buckner
et al., 1998), while face repetition and scene repetition
attenuation effects are found in the fusiform face area (FFA,
Jiang et al., 2006) and the parahippocampal place area (PPA,
Epstein et al., 1999), respectively.
Perceptual attention enhances stimulus-specific representa-
tions, as measured with fMRI repetition attenuation. An object
appearing in a cued location shows more repetition attenuation
than an object appearing in an uncued location (Eger et al.,
2004; Chee and Tan, 2007). In one study, participants were pre-
sented on each trial with a face and scene that overlapped
spatially and were cued to attend either to the face or the scene.
Repetition attenuation was observed in PPA when scenes were
repeated on a subsequent trial only when participants were in-
structed to attend to the scene on both the first and second
presentation (Yi and Chun, 2005). Thus, attention is important
for both encoding and expression of learning.
Reflective Attention
Component processes of reflection (Johnson and Hirst, 1993)
are the cognitive elements of what is often referred to as con-
trolled/executive processing or working memory (Baddeley,
1992; Smith and Jonides, 1999). Refreshing is the act of briefly
thinking of, and thereby foregrounding, a percept or thought
that was activated moments earlier. Rehearsingmaintains infor-
mation (e.g., several verbal items in a phonological loop, Badde-
ley, 1992), over longer intervals of several seconds. (Ranganath
et al., 2005 make a similar distinction between early and late
maintenance processes.) Selectively refreshing an activated
representation of a perceptual stimulus that has just disap-
peared, a thought that just became active, or an item that is
currently in an active rehearsal set boosts the strength of that
item relative to other active items, making it the focus of attention
(Cowan, 2001) and giving it a competitive advantage for addi-
tional processing. Thus, refreshing and rehearsing, individually
and together, constitute reflective attention that selects, main-
tains, and manipulates the contents of working memory.
Reviving representations that are not currently active involves
the component processes of reactivating or retrieving. Once
revived, these longer-term memory representations can be
further extended briefly by refreshing and/or rehearsing them.
Other reflective processes include noting and/or discovering
relations among active representations (processes underlying,
for example, elaboration and organization of information) and
initiating or shifting between representations, features, tasks,
or goals (processes needed, for example, to control or manipu-
late the sequence of mental events).
Thus, reflective attention selects, maintains, and manipulates
information from working memory and long-term memory and
promotes long-lasting memories (Craik and Lockhart, 1972;
Roediger and Karpicke, 2006; Tulving, 1962). For example,
in one study comparing refreshing to perceptual repetition,
participants viewed and read aloud words as they appeared
one at a time. Some words appeared and were read aloud
only once, some words appeared and were read aloud twiceNeuron 72, November 17, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 521
Figure 1. Comparing Reflective and Perceptual Attention
(A) Refresh condition: participants first saw a fixation cross, then a face and a scene picture, followed by an arrow cueing them to briefly think back to, or visualize,
either the face or the scene, as indicated by the direction of the arrow.
(B) Attend condition: participants first saw an arrow, cueing them to look only at the picture on the left or right side of the screen. This was followed by a face and
a scene picture and then a fixation cross.
(C) Act (control) condition: participants first saw a fixation cross, then a face and a scene picture, followed by a gray square cueing them simply to press a button
(and not think about either picture).
(D–J) Activation for each of seven scene-selective regions of interest across the five conditions of the task.
(K) Locations of these regions overlaid on the MNI single-subject template brain. Adapted from Johnson and Johnson, 2009, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience.
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words were read once and followed by a cue that signaled
participants to think of (refresh) the immediately preceding
word and say it out loud. A surprise test at the end of the exper-
iment revealed greater recognition memory for words that had
been refreshed than words that had been read once or read
twice (Johnson et al., 2002). Even greater effects on long-term
memory are yielded when information is reactivated and
retrieved on different occasions over time (Roediger and
Karpicke, 2006). If accurate source features are revived, reflec-
tively reviving events can protect against memory distortion
(Henkel, 2004).522 Neuron 72, November 17, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.To What Extent Do Perception and Reflection Share
Representations?
Do representations that are the outcome of perceptual attention
also serve as targets for reflective attention? Reflection modu-
lates activity in many of the same representational areas as
perceptual attention. For example, both refreshing and re-
hearsing modulate activity in posterior areas involved in percep-
tion (Curtis and D’Esposito, 2003; Harrison and Tong, 2009;
Johnson et al., 2009; Ranganath et al., 2005). Johnson et al.
(2009) directly compared selective perceptual and reflective
attention and found similar effects on sensory representations
(Figure 1). Participants were shown a scene and a face on
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to the scene or face or cued after the stimulus was removed to
refresh the scene or the face. Both perception (attend) and
reflection (refresh) showed comparable enhancement and
suppression effects relative to a passive viewing condition.
Althoughperceptual representationsand refreshed representa-
tions in workingmemory may engage the same brain areas, long-
term memory representations could be coded in areas different
from those of the processes that gave rise to them (Barsalou,
2008). However, fMRI evidence suggests that long-term memory
often involves reactivation of the same areas engaged during
encoding. Retrieving visual events during long-term memory
tasks activates visual cortex, while retrieving auditory events
from memory activates auditory cortex (Wheeler et al., 2000).
Importantly, the extent to which encoding activity is reinstated
during long-term remembering depends in part onwhat reflective
agenda is engaged during remembering (McDuff et al., 2009).
Further evidence that perception and reflection may each later
re-engage the same representations comes from a study in
which Turk-Browne et al. (2006) examined how repetition atten-
uation in scene-selective regions was related to measures of
explicit subsequent memory (Brewer et al., 1998; Wagner
et al., 1998). Each scene was repeated somewhere in the study
sequence and the experimenters sorted the data according to
whether or not each scene was later recognized. Repetition
attenuation in PPA (and behavioral priming) on the second
presentation was only significant for repeated items that were
later remembered (see also Gonsalves et al., 2005; Chee and
Tan, 2007), consistent with the idea that repetition attenuation
(a perceptual effect) draws on the same level of representation
(PPA) as does the phenomenal experience of remembering.
Other evidence that reflection and perception can operate on
the same representations comes from an fMRI study that
measured repetition suppression to assess representational
strength of previously viewed and previously refreshed scenes.
There were similar levels of repetition suppression in PPA for
items seen and refreshed once as for items seen twice (Yi
et al., 2008). The impact on long-term memory from viewing an
item once and refreshing it was equivalent to having seen the
item twice. This provides strong evidence that refreshing active
representations of perceptual events engages the same repre-
sentation (not simply the same representational area) and that
the consequences last beyond a few seconds. These findings
also support the idea that perception and reflection interact to
influence memory through the engagement of common repre-
sentations. Other evidence that perception and reflection can
share common representations is that a reflective representation
may serve as a ‘‘template’’ that affects perceptual selection
(Olivers et al., 2011). Additional research is needed to clarify to
what extent individual memories can be decoded from brain
activity at test. Currently, decoding category-specific activity
within ventral cortex during recall, using multivoxel pattern anal-
ysis (MVPA, Polyn et al., 2005), can signal the class of an item
one is probably remembering (e.g., scene, face, object). Also,
the ability to discriminate more specifically what a person is
remembering is starting to show promise. In a face recognition
task, MVPA reliably decoded whether or not participants said
they had seen faces but not whether they had actually seenthem (Rissman et al., 2010). This is consistent with behavioral
and fMRI evidence that true and false memories are attributions
about mental experiences based on their qualitative characteris-
tics (Johnson, 2006; Mitchell and Johnson, 2009). Mental
imagery of specific visual orientations can be decoded above
chance from low-level visual cortex (Kamitani and Tong, 2005),
and mental imagery of a small set of well-learned scenes can
be decoded above chance in scene-sensitive cortex (Johnson,
2011). MVPA of the hippocampus can differentiate episodic
memories of three film clips of everyday actions (Chadwick
et al., 2010). Furthermore, perceptual representations of more
diverse natural images can be reconstructed using quantitative
receptive-field models that characterize the relationship
between visual input and fMRI activity in early visual cortex (Na-
selaris et al., 2009; Nishimoto et al., 2011). Collectively, these
promising findings (see Danker and Anderson, 2010) suggest
that decoding of more specific memory representations, at least
of visual images, may be possible within the next few years.
There isutility in havingbothperceptual representations that are
more specific and reflective representations that are more
abstract and global. PRAM posits that classifiers should transfer
across perceptual and reflective tasks more successfully for
more abstract, global representations. Different brain regions
represent different types of information in perception (Bar, 2004;
Epstein and Higgins, 2007; Park et al., 2007; Park and Chun,
2009) and we would expect people to be differentially successful
in representing such information during reflection. For example,
PPA represents scene details whereas retrosplenial cortex (RSC)
represents less viewpoint-specific, more global information that
relates a scene to the larger environment (Epstein and Higgins,
2007; Bar, 2004; Park et al., 2007). In a direct comparison of
perceiving and refreshing stimuli across several areas of visual
cortex, perception showed greater activity in middle occipital
gyrus and PPA than did refreshing, but there was little difference
between perception and refreshing in RSC and precuneus (John-
son et al., 2007). At least for the hierarchy of visual processing,
PRAM predicts that perceptual and reflective representations
should be more confusable in high-level areas than in midlevel
or low-level visual areas. Indeed, in subsequent memory tasks,
precuneus activity during imagery is associated with later false
memory for the imagined items (Gonsalves et al., 2004). Thus,
understanding similarities and differences in how different brain
regions represent perceptual and reflective information may
help explain cases where the distinction between perception and
reflection breaks down, such as in schizophrenia (Simons et al.,
2006) or false memories for childhood events (Loftus, 2003).
Because even a simple stimulus such as a face or scene is not
represented only in one area, the relative contribution of different
regions to perceptual and reflective representations is a potential
way we discriminate between them. Cross-validation of classifi-
cation on brain activity engaged during perception and reflection
would be interesting not only for explicit memory tasks, but also
for implicit memory tasks. At what level of specificity can we
decode representations, even those not giving rise to the sub-
jective experience of recollection or familiarity? And using com-
bined information from multiple brain areas, can a classifier do
better than participants in discriminating between real and false
memories?Neuron 72, November 17, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 523
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For both perception and reflection, control mechanisms select
and sustain processing of target information and combat inter-
ference from perceptual or mnemonic distraction.
Attention to perceptual events recruits frontal and parietal
areas that modulate and maintain activity in other brain areas.
For example, changes in activity in posterior representation
areas as a function of attention are accompanied by increased
activation in frontal eye fields (FEF) and dorsal (SPL, IPS) and
ventral (IPL, SMG, TPJ, AG) parietal cortex (Corbetta et al.,
2000; Hopfinger et al., 2000; Kastner et al., 1999). Such activity
supports perceptual awareness (e.g., Asplund et al., 2010; De-
haene et al., 2006).
Reflective processes also depend heavily on frontal and pari-
etal mechanisms. Refreshing typically activates left dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex and left parietal regions (SMG and PCu) (Raye
et al., 2002). Refreshing one among several active representa-
tions (Johnson et al., 2005) also recruits anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC, an area associated with competition, Carter et al., 1998)
and left ventrolateral PFC (Brodmann Area [BA] 45, an area asso-
ciated with resolving interference, D’Esposito et al., 1999;
Thompson-Schill et al., 1997). Initiating refreshing or shifting
between refreshing and another task agenda recruits left rostro-
lateral PFC (BA 10, Raye et al., 2007), an area associated with
task switching, engaging subgoals, and attending to internal
representations (Braver and Bongiolatti, 2002; Burgess et al.,
2007; Henseler et al., 2011). In contrast, rehearsing information
tends to recruit left ventrolateral PFC (BA 44), premotor, pre-
SMA, and parietal cortex (SMG) (Chein and Fiez, 2010; D’Espo-
sito et al., 1999; Raye et al., 2007; Smith and Jonides, 1999).
Tasks requiring both maintenance and manipulation typically
show both VLPFC and DLPFC activity (Cohen et al., 1997).
The frontal and parietal areas active during refreshing and
rehearsing are typically found in more complex tasks requiring
executive function (Duncan andOwen, 2000; Smith and Jonides,
1999). That is, the foregrounding (refreshing) of task-relevant
information within working memory is important for most execu-
tive tasks that involve selective attention, taskmaintenance, task
switching, or manipulation of information (Miller and Cohen,
2001; Duncan and Owen, 2000; Smith and Jonides, 1999).
Furthermore, encoding activity in regions associated with com-
ponent processes of reflective attention predicts long-term
memory. Greater activity in DLPFC during refreshing at encoding
is associated with better subsequent long-term recognition
memory (Raye et al., 2002). Rote (phonological) rehearsal is
associated with activity in left ventrolateral PFC, as well as
supplementary motor area (SMA) (Jonides et al., 1998). Amount
of activation in these regions when participants are instructed to
rehearse predicts subsequent recognition memory (Davachi
et al., 2001). Relational processing at encoding is associated
with increased activity and subsequent memory effects in
ventrolateral PFC and, especially, dorsolateral PFC (e.g., Blu-
menfeld and Ranganath, 2007; Staresina and Davachi, 2006).
Neural activity that occurs during remembering has also been
vigorously investigated. Many studies show activity in DLPFC
and VLPFC during recognition and recall in long-term memory
tasks, and there are increasing efforts to differentially associate
different PFC areas with subprocesses involved in reviving524 Neuron 72, November 17, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.and/or evaluating information (e.g., Mitchell and Johnson,
2009). For example, there is evidence that rostrolateral PFC
maintains memory-relevant goals or specific agendas to look
for a particular type of information (e.g., Dobbins and Han, 2006).
Dissociable Control Mechanisms of Perceptual
and Reflective Attention
The review above indicates that frontal and parietal regions are
engaged during both perceptual and reflective attention. This
similarity probably reflects the fact that they are serving related
functions. However, according to PRAM, perceptual and reflec-
tive attention should be dissociable at the neural level. A growing
body of work makes distinctions similar to that between percep-
tual and reflective attention: stimulus-oriented versus stimulus-
independent attending (Burgess et al., 2007), selective attention
versus memorial selection (Nee and Jonides, 2009), attentional
orienting in the perceptual domain versus the working memory
domain (Lepsien and Nobre, 2006), and attentional modulation
of sensory information and information in working memory
(Awh et al., 2006). Although the literature directly comparing
perception and reflection is still quite small, recent studies are
beginning to advance our understanding of the relation between
perception and reflection and their consequences for memory.
In one direct comparison of perceptual attention and reflective
attention to word stimuli (Roth et al., 2009), regions more active
for perceptual attention (reading) included right frontal cortex
and bilateral posterior visual cortex. Activity more specific to
reflective attention (refreshing) was recorded in left dorsolateral
frontal cortex, left temporal cortex, and bilateral inferior frontal
cortex. Another comparison between perceptual selection and
reflective selection found that the superior parietal lobule and
frontal eye fields were more specific to perceptual selection,
while left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex was more specific to
reflective selection (see Figures 2A and 2B; Nee and Jonides,
2009). Attention to locations within mental representations
revealed stronger activations in frontal cortex compared to
attending to locations in perceptual arrays (Nobre et al., 2004).
Furthermore, rostromedial PFC was more active during percep-
tual attention, while rostrolateral PFC was more active during
reflective attention (see Figure 2C;Henseler et al., 2011). Burgess
et al. (2007) note that the region of rostral medial PFC that was
more active for perceptual and reflective cognitive tasks is ante-
rior to the medial PFC area that is typically found when partici-
pants are not engaged in a task (‘‘rest’’) or when they are specif-
ically instructed to engage in self-referential thinking (see below).
Sestieri et al. (2010) compared a perceptual attention task in
which participants looked for specific targets in a video (e.g.,
‘‘Can you detect a man standing on the street wearing red
pants?’’) and responded ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no,’’ with a reflective attention
task in which they responded ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ to recognition test
items about videos seen previously (‘‘Richard mentioned his
problem with alcohol before his intimacy problem’’). For the
perceptual task they found activity in SPL and posterior IPS,
regions commonly found in perceptual attention tasks. For the
memory task, they found areas of AG, SMG, lateral IPS, and
medial areas (PCu, PCC, RSC). These findings suggest a disso-
ciation of regions engaged during perceptual and reflective
attention. However, this study did not equate items across
Figure 2. Comparing Perceptual Attention and Reflective Attention
(A) Regions active for high versus low selection in a perceptual selection task (top), memory selection task (middle), and the conjunction of both tasks (bottom).
(B) Regions unique to perceptual selection (left) and memorial selection (right).
(C) Differential activation of the rostromedial and rostrolateral PFC during attentional orientation to external and internal information, respectively. Center: brain
activation map showing significantly stronger activation of the anterior rostromedial PFC during the orientation of attention to external as compared to internal
information (blue), and significantly stronger activation of the rostrolateral PFC during the orientation of attention to internal as compared to external information
(red). The scale below shows the color-coding of the displayed T values. Periphery: parameter estimates extracted from the rostromedial PFC (left side) and
rostrolateral PFC (right side) color coded for the different tasks (blue: externally oriented position task; purple: externally oriented target task; red: internally
oriented task). (A) and (B) from Nee and Jonides (2009), Neuroimage; (C) from Henseler et al. (2011), Neuroimage.
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Sestieri et al., the memory retrieval task likely involved an
‘‘ensemble of processes’’ (p. 8453) and thus was not designed
to contrast specific component processes of perceptual and/
or reflective attention.
Functional connectivity analyses help to segregate function-
ally different networks (Fox et al., 2006; Corbetta et al., 2008;
Chadick and Gazzaley, 2011). PRAM predicts different patterns
of connectivity between representational areas and frontal
and/or parietal cortex for perceptual versus reflective tasks.
Also, the timing of activity between frontal and parietal control
mechanisms may yield differences between perceptual and
reflective attention. For example, frontal activity occurs before
parietal activity during top-down perceptual attention, while
parietal activity precedes frontal activity during bottom-up
perceptual attention (e.g., Buschman and Miller, 2007). It wouldbe useful to see whether such findings extend to reflective
attention tasks.
Dissociations between patterns of enhancement and suppres-
sion also show differences between perceptual and reflective
attention. During encoding of multiple items presented in a
sequence, older adults showed intact enhancement but disrup-
ted suppression effects relative to young adults, suggesting
that enhancement and suppression are dissociable processes
(Gazzaley et al., 2005). Although it provided evidence regarding
overall enhancement and suppression effects during encoding,
the design of the Gazzaley et al. study did not separately assess
effects of perceptual and reflective attention. Evidence that
perceptual and reflective attention are also dissociable comes
from a study finding that older adults showed disrupted suppres-
sion during refreshing, but not during perceptual attention, while
enhancement effects in both perceptual and reflective attentionNeuron 72, November 17, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 525
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works for enhancement and suppression appear dissociable.
Functional connectivity analysis during a perceptual attention
task revealed that visual cortical areas that process target
information coupled with right MFG and bilateral IFJ during
enhancement and with mPFC and PCC during suppression
(Chadick and Gazzaley, 2011). The differences between
enhancement and suppression in connectivity suggest that on-
task perceptual attention contributed to enhancement effects
and that off-task, self-referential attention (activating the ‘‘default
network’’ [see below]) contributed to suppression effects. Addi-
tional studies are needed to compare such network effects for
perception and reflection.
Bottom-Up and Top-Down Orienting in Perception
or Reflection
Perceptual attention is controlled by two orienting systems (Cor-
betta and Shulman, 2002; Corbetta et al., 2008). A dorsal system
includes the frontal eye fields (FEF) and intraparietal cortex (IPS,
SPL) and is involved in goal-directed, top-down attention to
stimuli. A ventral network includes inferior frontal cortex and
IPL (TPJ) and is specialized for bottom-up detection of salient
or unexpected events. The ventral network has a right hemi-
sphere bias and mediates the ability to ‘‘reorient’’ quickly to
salient events that are potentially rewarding or dangerous to an
observer. Reorienting involves interruption and resetting of on-
going activity in the dorsal network, which otherwise suppresses
the ventral network during focused and sustained attention to an
ongoing task. One would expect that perceptual attention would
be important for encoding events for long-term memory (LTM)
and indeed, this is the case. For example, Uncapher et al.
(2011) found that cuing top-down perceptual attention to an
upcoming target location engaged the IPS and was associated
with better subsequent memory, while cuing participants to an
invalid nontarget location engaged TPJ and was associated
with poorer subsequent memory. Presumably, activity in TPJ re-
flected perceptual capture and/or reorienting necessary when
the cued location did not contain a target. These findings provide
important evidence of the role during encoding of top-down and
bottom-up perceptual attention, but the study did not compare
perceptual and reflective attention.
Whether a simple dorsal/ventral distinction applies to remem-
bering is a subject of current debate. Lateral parietal activity is
commonly found to be associated with correct recognition
memory for old items (Vilberg and Rugg, 2008). It has been
proposed that the dorsal/ventral distinction in perceptual atten-
tion may generalize to the kind of reflective attention processes
engaged during remembering. Cabeza et al. (2008) and Ciara-
melli et al. (2008) suggested that superior parietal cortex
supports retrieval search, monitoring, and verification, similar
to its role in the top-down, voluntary control of perceptual atten-
tion, and that inferior parietal cortex is active when there is clear
and more detailed recollection, similar to the exogenous capture
of attention by salient, bottom-up perceptual events. However,
a comparison by Hutchinson et al. (2009) of their meta-analysis
of regions involved in top-down and bottom-up attention, with
previously published analyses of top-down and bottom-up
effects in episodic remembering (Ciaramelli et al., 2008; Vilberg526 Neuron 72, November 17, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.and Rugg, 2008), did not support the idea of overlap between
perceptual attention and memory processes, especially for
ventral parietal cortex. And, as noted above, Sestieri et al.
(2010) found different parietal areas associated with their
perceptual and memory search tasks.
Nevertheless, as Wagner et al. (2005) suggested, parietal
activity is associated with a number of factors important for
memory judgments, including a subjective sense that the rele-
vant information is old or new (independent of the memory’s
veracity, Johnson, 2006), level of detail that the memory
supports, and retrieval orientation—the type of detail that partic-
ipants are asked to retrieve about target memories. That is, pari-
etal mechanisms may be involved in attending to internal,
mnemonic representations, act as a buffer to integrate details
that have been activated, reflect the overall strength of memo-
ries, and/or play a role in the evaluation of the task relevance
of what is remembered (Wagner et al., 2005; Cabeza et al.,
2008; Vilberg and Rugg, 2008; Shimamura, 2011).
Importantly, the PRAM framework assumes that the distinc-
tion between perceptual and reflective attention is orthogonal
to the distinction between top-down and bottom-up attention
(Chun et al., 2011; Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). Thus, efforts
to compare control mechanisms for perceptual and reflective
information should attempt to equate whether attention is
directed to the task stimuli in a top-down or bottom-up manner.
Studies to date typically relied on top-down manipulations (Nee
and Jonides, 2009; Henseler et al., 2011; Roth et al., 2009). It
would be helpful to introduce stimuli that capture attention in
a bottom-up manner to assess the extent to which a common
ventral network is engaged in both perceptual and reflective
tasks. That is, it would be useful to directly compare four condi-
tions: top-down and bottom-up attentional conditions in both
perceptual and reflective tasks.
Resolving Interference within Perceptual
and Reflective Attention
Perception and reflection both need selective mechanisms to
resolve interference. Perception requires focusing on task-rele-
vant information from among perceptually present task-irrele-
vant information. Perceptual competition makes it more difficult
to find a T among Ls than among Os in visual search and can
even produce quite dramatic examples of blindness to unat-
tended information (Simons and Chabris, 1999; reviewed in
Marois and Ivanoff, 2005). Resolution of competition (successful
selection) occurs when goals bias activation in favor of goal rele-
vant features (Desimone and Duncan, 1995).
During perceptual identification, the strength of sensory
evidence for a target can be measured by the strength of activity
within a cortical region for the target category. Competing per-
ceptual hypotheses, as under conditions of perceptual noise
and degradation, arise from similar levels of activity within
different cortical representational regions. For example, when
trying to discriminate a face from a house under near-threshold
conditions of degradation, successful recognition is dependent
on FFA activity being greater than baseline and greater than
PPA activity. Frontal and parietal mechanisms presumably eval-
uate the sensory evidence and suppress competing information.
In particular, the findings shown in Figures 3A and 3B are
Figure 3. Perceptual and Reflective Resolution of Competition
(A) Activity in posterior DLPFC (left SFS) during perceptual discrimination of faces versus houses showing a higher response to suprathreshold images of faces
and houses relative to perithreshold images, and a correlation with the difference in activity in face versus house selective areas, suggesting that this region
integrates evidence from sensory processing areas to make perceptual decisions.
(B) Signal changes in the posterior portion of theDLPFCpredicted task performance. Points represent average BOLD change and performance for each condition
(suprathreshold face, perithreshold face, perithreshold house, and suprathreshold house) and participant.
(C) Frontoparietal regions that were more active during memory retrieval for trials on which a classifier showed less activity for a target category under conditions
of A-B, A-C interference (A was words and B and C were faces and scenes).
(D) Response in several regions of interest was characterized by marked activation for AC trials associated with low-fidelity reactivation. (A) and (B) adapted from
Heekeren et al. (2004), Nature; (C) and (D) adapted from Kuhl et al. (2011), PNAS.
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evaluates sensory evidence from posterior sensory areas to
make perceptual discrimination decisions for target stimuli
degraded with noise; stronger activity was associated with
better psychophysical performance (Heekeren et al., 2004).
Other regions including IPS and frontal eye field were more
active during perceptually difficult conditions.
Reflection also involves the resolution of interference—com-
petition from representations cued because they share features
(e.g., spatial or temporal context, objects or people, perceptual
or emotional qualities) with a target event. Examples of retrieval
competition include proactive interference, when older memo-
ries interfere with the ability to retrieve more recent information
(e.g., ‘‘Where did I park my car today?’’), or retroactive interfer-
ence, when newer memories interfere with older ones (e.g.,
‘‘What was my former address?’’) (Wixted, 2004). Resolution of
such competition or interference is an act of selective reflective
attention analogous to perceptual attention (Kuhl et al., 2011;
Heekeren et al., 2004).
Patients with frontal lobe damage show greater deficits under
conditions of increased mnemonic competition (Shimamura
et al., 1995; Smith et al., 1995). Functional neuroimaging helps
to specify the relative roles of different areas of PFC. For example,
left ventrolateral PFC is more active in the face of interference,
both during encoding (Dolan et al., 1997; Fletcher et al., 2000)
and retrieval (Badre et al., 2005; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997).
After learning person-location pairs (e.g., ‘‘The hippie is in the
park’’), subsequent retrieval of any association (hippie-park,
yes/no?) is slower when more facts are associated with the
same concept, producing slower response times and greater
activity in left VLPFC (BA 44/45) (Sohn et al., 2003). As noted
above, left VLPFC isalsomoreactiveas interferenceaccumulates
over trials during working memory tasks and may play a role in
overcoming proactive interference (Jonides and Nee, 2006).
Retrieval competition in LTM is often studied with an A-B/A-C
paradigm. A list of A-B pairs is studied, with the goal of being
able later to recall B (target) when A (cue) is presented. Later in
the experiment, some of the A cues are paired with new targets
(A-C) for new learning. Relative to other completely newD-E cue-
target pairs, subsequent memory for A-C pairs is impaired
(proactive interference from the earlier A-B pairs), and memory
for A-B pairs is impaired (retroactive interference from the
more recent A-C pairs). For example, Kuhl et al. (2011) asked
participants to associate cue words with faces or scenes, and
a given cue was associated with both a face and a scene. Since
faces and scenes have distinguishable representations in
ventral-occipito-temporal cortex (including FFA and PPA), Kuhl
et al. used MVPA to decode the relative strength of face and
scene activation during memory retrieval to investigate how
recall for an A-C pairing was affected by the earlier A-B pairing.
Competition between associates B and C (from opposing face-
scene categories) was assessed by the degree towhich the clas-
sifier favored either face or scene activity. Compared to control
items without competition, classifier performance was poorer
for items with face/scene competition, suggesting that target
and competing memories were being simultaneously reacti-
vated. Furthermore when the classifier indicated more conflict,
frontal and parietal areas were more strongly engaged, suggest-528 Neuron 72, November 17, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.ing a role for these areas in resolving mnemonic conflict between
target and competing memories (see Figures 3C and 3D). Active
regions included dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, medial prefrontal
cortex, and lateral and medial parietal cortex. Overall, the results
support a model in which multiple representations are reacti-
vated in sensory areas, and control mechanisms in frontal and
parietal lobes serve to resolve the interference and select a repre-
sentation.
What is the fate of competing memories that are not selected
during remembering? When goal-relevant memories are consis-
tently and repeatedly retrieved, competing memories are often
forgotten. That is, retrieval competition appears to at least some-
times be resolved through inhibition of competing memories,
mediated by PFC mechanisms (Anderson et al., 2004). Further-
more, over time, forgetting is accompanied by reduced involve-
ment of cognitive control mechanisms required for detecting
(anterior cingulate cortex) and resolving (dorsolateral and ventro-
lateral prefrontal cortex) mnemonic competition (Kuhl et al.,
2007). Thus forgetting has the adaptive benefit of reducing the
burden on cognitive control mechanisms (Anderson, 2003).
Fluctuations in Perceptual and Reflective Attention
As a series of items appears at the focus of perceptual attention,
an observer may try to sustain attention equally to every item
but, typically, some items are encoded and retrieved better
than others. Considering variations in perceptual and reflective
attention can help explain this variability. Emotional significance
or perceptual salience can draw more attention to some items
(‘‘attentional capture’’), enhancing memory (Mather, 2007;
Phelps, 2006). People may be more successful in noting associ-
ations or using elaborative strategies that facilitate encoding for
some items than others (Craik and Lockhart, 1972). Distraction
or mind wandering will reduce memory (Weissman et al.,
2006). Both perceptual and reflective attention have limited
capacity, and the fact that they often trade-off suggests that
they are not entirely independent.
Researchers have identified some of the neural changes asso-
ciated with trial-to-trial fluctuations in attention and their conse-
quences formemory, and PRAMattempts to explain subsequent
memory according to variation in either perceptual or reflective
attention to different items. As described above, in studies of
LTM using simple materials (e.g., words, pictures) various lateral
PFC, lateral parietal, and MTL regions show greater activity for
subsequently remembered than forgotten items (Blumenfeld
and Ranganath, 2007; Diana et al., 2007; Kim, 2011; Uncapher
and Wagner, 2009). In contrast, greater activity for subsequently
forgotten than remembered items is often found in medial PFC
and medial parietal cortex (posterior cingulate, precuneus,
TPJ; Kim et al., 2010; Otten and Rugg, 2001; Park et al., 2008;
Turk-Browne et al., 2006; Uncapher et al., 2011). Interestingly,
these same regions are active when participants are cued to
engage in reflective, self-referential, internally oriented process-
ing (e.g., Gusnard et al., 2001; Ochsner et al., 2005), such as
thinking about their aspirations or obligations (Johnson et al.,
2006). This suggests that forgotten items in non-self-referential
cognitive tasks were ones for which the participant’s attention
was momentarily diverted from the task and focused on more
personal concerns. In fact, these same anterior and posterior
Neuron
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when no task at all is specified, than during many cognitive tasks
(and are part of what is known as the ‘‘default network,’’ Raichle
et al., 2001; Buckner et al., 2008). It should be noted that when
self-referential processing is relevant to a later memory task,
activation in medial PFC is positively related to later memory
(e.g., Macrae et al., 2004; Kim and Johnson, 2010).
Limited attention is not necessarily allocated in an all-or-none
manner but may be distributed between primary (target) and
other (nontarget or task-irrelevant) information (Pashler, 1998).
For example, according to load theory (Lavie, 2005), the amount
of processing that nominally ‘‘unattended’’ stimuli receive
depends on how much processing is devoted to the primary, at-
tended target task. Difficult primary tasks (high load) consume
attention; easy primary tasks (low load) do not fully consume
attention, which thus spills over to process ‘‘unattended’’ stimuli.
Consistent with load theory, increasing the perceptual difficulty
of a target task can eliminate negative priming from unattended
distractors (Lavie and Fox, 2000). In contextual learning tasks,
increasing the difficulty of the search through attended arrays
decreases implicit learning of unattended arrays (Jiang and
Chun, 2001). In repetition attenuation studies, increasing the
perceptual difficulty of a primary task reduced repetition attenu-
ation for repeated cycles of task-irrelevant background images
(Yi et al., 2004). Interestingly, there is some evidence that in
reflective tasks (e.g., recall), the negative impact of a concurrent
reflective task (e.g., recognition) depends at encoding on
whether the two tasks engage similar processes and, at retrieval,
depends on whether the two tasks engaged similar representa-
tions (Fernandes and Moscovitch, 2000).
Our distinction between perceptual and reflective attention
relates to how Lavie (2005) distinguished between perceptual
and central (e.g., working memory, executive control) difficulty.
This helps predict when perceptual and reflective attention trade
off with each other or when they are independent. In some situ-
ations, reflection and perception clearly interfere with each other.
For example, carrying on a conversation on a cell phone dramat-
ically reduces perception and memory for stimuli encountered in
a driving task (Strayer et al., 2003). Perceptual distraction (visual
or auditory) disrupts reflective memory for visual details of
pictures (Wais et al., 2011; Wais et al., 2010). In other situations,
there is little or no evidence of interference between perception
and reflection. For example, in one study, Yi et al. (2004) manip-
ulated working memory load (central/reflective processing) and
found no impact on processing or implicit memory for an unat-
tended, repeating background. Importantly, perceptual load
manipulations of comparable difficulty did affect background
processing. Another case where reflection did not disrupt
perceptual learning comes from a study by Watanabe et al.
(2001). Participants were given a primary task that required
them to detect and be able to report target stimuli in a series of
rapidly changing visual stimuli (a rapid serial visual presentation
or RSVP task). In RSVP tasks, rapidly presented stimuli are
perceptually processed to a level at which they are identified,
butmemory for the target depends onmore than perceptual pro-
cessing—it depends on central (reflective) processes that
encode the target into working memory (Chun and Potter,
1995). One possibility is that this is accomplished via brieflyrefreshing the target. In the Watanabe et al. study, the RSVP
task occurred against a background display of coherently
moving dot stimuli embedded in enough random noise that their
trajectory could not be consciously perceived or guessed above
chance levels. Perceptual learning occurred for this unconscious
but coherent background motion in spite of the perceptual and
reflective demands of the primary RSVP task.
Theseexamples highlight thequestionofwhat kindsof percep-
tual processes are and are not affected by reflective demands
and vice versa. At least part of the answer should depend on
whether perceptual and reflective attention similarly or differen-
tially engage the same or different brain areas and networks.
Furthermore, the answer to this should in turn depend on
exactly which perceptual and which reflective processes are
being compared. Insofar as different reflective processes (e.g.,
refreshing, rehearsing, retrieving) differentially engage specific
frontal andparietal regions,wewouldexpect them todifferentially
interact with specific perceptual attention tasks. For example,
some types of perceptual learning show effects in a very early
visual processing area (V1) but not in other visual areas (V2, V3)
nor in parietal or frontal cortex (Yotsumoto et al., 2008). V1 is an
area relatively unlikely to be activated during reflection.
Thus, more work is needed to clarify the relations between
perceptual load and reflective load (or central load, Lavie,
2005). These two types of load have been dissociated in some
prior studies, but not all. For example, active manipulation of
information in working memory (e.g., counting backward), which
involves reflective processing, impairs concurrent visual search
efficiency (Han and Kim, 2004). Perceptual secondary tasks
frequently disrupt reflective processing as well. For example,
when making categorical decisions about visual stimuli, partici-
pants can be asked to concurrently perform an easy or difficult
auditory monitoring task. Dividing attention with a difficult
secondary task engaged DLPFC and superior parietal regions,
impairing both visual task performance and subsequent memory
for the stimuli (Uncapher and Rugg, 2005).
While both inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and hippocampus show
subsequent memory effects, these areas are affected by divided
attention (dual task) in some experiments (Kensinger et al., 2003)
but not others (Uncapher and Rugg, 2005). Differences in exper-
imental outcomes may be explained by how well participants
can share processing across dual tasks—that is, whether or
not the two overlapping tasks recruit the same type of attentional
processing (Uncapher and Rugg, 2008) or involve the same
general representational areas (Fernandes and Moscovitch,
2000). In addition, different encoding conditions yield qualita-
tively different types of memory experiences. For example, Ken-
singer et al. (2003) found that words encoded under difficult
divided attention conditions yielded a sense of familiarity, while
words encoded with easier concurrent tasks yielded a more
detailed (‘‘recollective’’) experience. Overall, whether two tasks
interfere with each other should depend on whether common
processes are important for the task and the type of representa-
tions involved. In sum, because perceptual load and reflective
(central) load interfere differently with perceptual tasks (Lavie
and De Fockert, 2005; Yi et al., 2004), they will probably have
different effects on reflective tasks. Thus, dual-task studies
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absence of divided attention costs. Furthermore, task switching
studies would produce revealing findings regarding the impor-
tant question of the mechanisms by which the cognitive system
switches between perceptual and reflective attention (e.g.,
Burgess et al., 2007).
The brain is active even when at rest, and investigators have
begun to explore the functional connectivity between areas
when participants are not given an explicit task (Fox and Raichle,
2007). Early interest focused on the relation between a general
‘‘task-positive network’’ including regions often found in cogni-
tive tasks and a ‘‘task-negative network’’ including regions that
often deactivate during cognitive tasks and activate during rest
(Fox and Raichle, 2007). These networks are also evident during
sleep and anesthesia, consistent with the idea that they originate
from intrinsic connectivity rather than uncontrolled, spontaneous
cognition. Investigators are beginning to identify other ‘‘resting
state networks’’ (RSNs) that are similar to networks found during
explicit task manipulations (Smith et al., 2009). Thus, a potential
direction for future research is whether dissociable intrinsic
networks can be identified that are associated with differences
in perceptual versus reflective attention (when the content is
held constant).
The Role of Attention in Binding Features
and in Consolidation
It was once thought that the hippocampus was the memory
region and that frontal and parietal cortex served other functions
(cognition, attention). However, as noted above, the specific
roles of frontal and parietal cortex in both attention and memory
are under active investigation. It is also now recognized that
other structures in the MTL (entorhinal cortex, perirhinal cortex,
and parahippocampal cortex) are important for memory (Ranga-
nath, 2010). Although some maintain that evidence that various
MTL structures have different functions in memory is weak
(Squire et al., 2004), others have concluded they play differential
roles in either item versus relational memory, the types of
features they process (e.g., object versus spatial), or the level
of representation at which binding occurs (Davachi, 2006; Ei-
chenbaum et al., 2007; Shimamura, 2010). Nevertheless there
is common agreement that the hippocampus (and perhaps other
MTL structures, Shimamura, 2010) mediates binding among
features (e.g., location, color, time) and of features with prior
knowledge (e.g., schemas, Tse et al., 2007).
The importance of the hippocampus for long-term episodic
memory is beyond debate based on patient and lesion data
(Squire and Wixted, 2011; Eichenbaum et al., 2007). Consistent
with patient data are neuroimaging findings of hippocampal
activity during long-termmemory tests, especially during source
memory tasks (Weis et al., 2004) and correlations between
hippocampal activity and the subjective experience of remem-
bered details (Addis et al., 2004). Neuroimaging data from
studies of long-term memory have also made it clear that the
hippocampus is engaged not only during remembering, but
also during encoding. For example, hippocampal activity during
encoding predicts better source memory on a later test (Davachi
et al., 2003), further suggesting a major role for the hippocampus
in initial feature binding.530 Neuron 72, November 17, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.Although most research on the MTL has focused on its role in
long-term memory, it is increasingly evident that the hippo-
campus plays a much broader role in perception and reflection.
With respect to short-term memory, MTL damage impairs
working memory for visual objects across delays as short as
4 s (Olson et al., 2006). Furthermore, object-location conjunction
information can be impaired across delays as short as 8 s with
MTL damage (Hannula et al., 2006; Olson et al., 2006). During
perception, contextual representations mediated by the hippo-
campus/MTL can facilitate object recognition (Bar, 2004), guide
the focus of attention (Chun and Phelps, 1999; Summerfield
et al., 2006), and generate perceptual anticipation (Turk-Browne
et al., 2010). Differences in eyemovement patterns when viewing
a previously seen versus a novel stimulus provide an implicit
measure of memory, and hippocampal activity and its connec-
tivity with lateral PFC predicts eye movement measures of
memory for relational information (Hannula and Ranganath,
2009). Furthermore, MTL damage can also impair perceptual
tasks requiring difficult object discriminations (Baxter, 2009;
but see Suzuki, 2009) or visual associations (Degonda et al.,
2005; Chun and Phelps, 1999). These findings of hippocampal
involvement in long-term memory, working memory, and
perception make clear that the hippocampus is engaged in an
ongoing fashion during cognition. Is there a general function
being served in these various situations? One possibility is that
the hippocampus helps bridge temporal and spatial gaps
between features of experience so that information that is not
strictly contiguous can be bound together (Johnson and Chal-
fonte, 1994; Staresina and Davachi, 2009). Of course, the hippo-
campus may bind whatever features are contiguous (perceptu-
ally or reflectively) and other regions (e.g., frontal and parietal)
may actually do the bridging, for example, via refreshing (Park
et al., 2010; Park and Chun, 2009).
From the PRAM perspective, a critical issue is how perceptual
and reflective attention affect MTL function. Assuming that
attention modulates MTL regions, are different frontal, parietal,
and/or MTL regions engaged during perceptual and reflective
attention? Do attentional networks that include MTL depend
on the type of perception (e.g., focal, peripheral), the type of
reflection (e.g., refreshing, reactivating), or the type of target
(scenes versus objects versus faces)?
Intriguing recent work demonstrates that hippocampal-
cortical interactions occur not only during encoding, but also
during retention intervals during which participants have no
explicit task (‘‘rest’’). For example, functional connectivity
between the hippocampus and the lateral occipital complex
(LOC) during a rest period predicts subsequent memory for
face-object pairs, presumably reflecting a consolidation process
during the retention interval (Tambini et al., 2010). Tambini et al.
concluded that evidence of hippocampal-LOC connectivity
during resting was unlikely to reflect active rehearsal of the target
information during rest.
Can patterns of incidental functional connectivity after an
experience be distinguished according to whether they were
initiated by perceptual encoding or by reflective encoding?
Does reflection during encoding contribute to memory not only
via, for example, elaborated encoding, but also by jumpstarting
critical consolidation processes during rest? Another important
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can be distinguished from spontaneous reflection (reactivating,
retrieving) during rest. Can we discriminate reactivations that
have functional significance but (1) do not yield a subjective
experience of target information coming to mind; (2) yield the
phenomenal experience of a target coming to mind, but not
attributed to memory; (3) yield the phenomenal experience of
remembering; (4) are the result of active attempts to remember?
Another function that both perception and reflection share is
binding multiple features into coherent objects or event repre-
sentations. Failure to bind correctly can result in illusory conjunc-
tions during perception (Treisman and Schmidt, 1982) or source
memory errors during recall (Johnson, 2006). The intraparietal
sulcus serves to bind different features together, important for
feature integration in perceptual tasks (Corbetta et al., 1995;
Friedman-Hill et al., 1995) and encoding in episodic memory
tasks (Uncapher et al., 2006). That is, greater activity in IPS is
correlated with successful encoding of combinations of features.
What are the respective roles of parietal cortex and hippo-
campus in binding? Two potential differences require further
investigation. The first difference concerns the type of informa-
tion that undergoes binding (reviewed in Mitchell and Johnson,
2009). The hippocampal system can bind and associate objects
andeventswith each other and across domains (e.g., associating
two different faces, or a face and a place, Mayes et al., 2007),
while the parietal cortex might be more focused on binding
multiple features into coherent objects or episodes (e.g., the
screen location and font color of words, Uncapher et al., 2006).
Related to this difference in the level of binding, the second
potential difference may be one of time scale. The function of
the hippocampal system for long-term, durable binding seems
uncontroversial. Parietal cortex was originally considered to be
primarily involved in binding features during perception.
However, Shimamura (2011) recently highlighted how episodic
retrieval (reflective attention in PRAM) contributes to feature
binding, and proposes that ventral parietal cortex is a conver-
gence zone for integrating episodic information (the cortical
binding of relational activity [CoBRA] model).
Necessity of Brain Regions for Perception
and Reflection
Although there is increasing evidence that different brain areas
cooperate and interact during both perceptual attention and
reflective attention, whether such activity is necessary for a
particular function is indeterminate from brain imaging data
alone. To simplify greatly, damage to the parietal cortex impairs
spatial attention, but memory less so. In contrast, damage to the
hippocampus and other medial temporal lobe regions impairs
explicit memory, but perception less so. However, newer work
challenges this simplification, as parietal damage can result in
memory impairments in specific situations such as free recall,
but not recognition (Berryhill et al., 2007), and produces deficits
in perceptual binding (Friedman-Hill et al., 1995), but not asso-
ciative learning (Simons et al., 2008). Conversely, hippocampus/
MTL damage can impair perceptual/attentional tasks (Murray
et al., 2007; Chun and Phelps, 1999). Thus, more neuropsycho-
logical work is needed to investigate to what extent parietal
mechanisms are necessary for reflective processes and towhat extent hippocampus and medial temporal lobe structures
are necessary for perception. For disrupting both frontal and
parietal function in humans, transcranial magnetic stimulation
studies are promising (Miller et al., 2008; Zanto et al., 2011; Mor-
ishima et al., 2009).
Conclusion
The fields of attention and memory are beneficiaries of an
increasingly vast amount of research in cognitive neuroscience,
each complex and rich in its own right. The goal of a framework is
to synthesize available evidence and suggest new directions for
systematic analysis (Johnson, 2007). The PRAM framework and
related empirical findings suggest that considering the similari-
ties and differences between perception and reflection can
help clarify and integrate the study of attention and memory to
advance understanding of each in a symbiotic way and point
to potentially fruitful areas of additional research.
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